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Social evaluation is a mental process that leverages the preference toward prosocial
partners (positivity bias) against the avoidance of antisocial individuals (negativity bias)
in a cooperative context. The phenomenon is well-known in humans, and recently
comparative investigations looked at the possible evolutionary origins. So far social
evaluation has been investigated mainly in non-human and human primates and dogs,
however, there are few data on the presence of negativity/positivity bias in client-
cleaner reef fish interactions as well. Unfortunately, the comparative approach to social
evaluation is hindered by conceptual and procedural differences in experimental studies.
By reviewing current knowledge on social evaluation in different species, we aim to
point out that the capacity for social evaluation is not restricted to humans alone;
however, its building blocks (negativity and positivity bias) may be more widespread
separately. Due to its importance in survival, negativity bias likely to be widespread
among animals; however, there has been less intensive selective pressure for the
identification of prosocial companions, thus the latter ability may have emerged only
in certain social species. We present a general framework and argue that negativity and
positivity bias evolve independently and can be considered as social evaluation only if a
unified behavior and cognitive system deals with both biases in concert.
Keywords: social evaluation, eavesdropping, image scoring, reputation, negativity bias, positivity bias, third-party
interaction, comparative psychology
INTRODUCTION
Individuals of many species form temporary or permanent groups. Living closely to conspecifics
has benefits such as more efficient defense against predators or hunting, however, the competition
over resources may also increase among group members. It is assumed that the recognition of
group mates as prosocial or antisocial is important in many gregarious species to predict the future
behavior of others (Bonnie and Earley, 2007; Subiaul et al., 2008; Bräuer, 2014). Thus this skill can
contribute to survival due to the avoidance of harmful individuals and can facilitate the choice
of an appropriate partner to engage in successful cooperation. In recent years, growing body of
studies have been conducted on different species investigating whether individuals show different
behavior toward prosocial and antisocial partners. The phenomenon was studied mainly in human
infants (Homo sapiens), non-human primate species (e.g., chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes) and dogs
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(Canis familiaris). Although researchers used similar behavioral
framework (cooperative context) they approached the question
from different perspectives and used different terminology to
describe the phenomenon. This makes it difficult to examine the
evolutionary origin of social evaluation which we define as the
ability to distinguish between antisocial and prosocial others and
display different behavior toward them.
In human infants researchers often discuss the ability
to distinguish between antisocial and prosocial partners in
relation to moral development under the term social evaluation
(Hamlin et al., 2007). According to Sheskin and Santos
(2012), the results of these experiments suggest that human
infants show an early form of morality concerning the
harm domain (Haidt and Joseph, 2008) relatively early in
ontogeny. Hamlin (2013b) argued that moral sense might
have evolved to sustain cooperation. Thus social evaluation
provides the mental support to discriminate between potential
partners in a cooperative context. In studies with non-human
primates researchers used a similar viewpoint considering the
problem of choosing the appropriate partner to cooperate
with and more importantly, to avoid harmful individuals.
However, these authors used different terms to describe
the phenomenon, such as reputation formation (Herrmann
et al., 2013), image scoring (Russell et al., 2008) and social
evaluation (Anderson et al., 2013a). Researchers working on
dogs referred to this skill mostly as social eavesdropping
(Marshall-Pescini et al., 2011). In conclusion, authors from
different research areas use related concepts to describe similar
phenomena that have probably similar function in the different
species.
Here, our aim is to present a general framework for this
skill, which we refer to as social evaluation. Further, we
review experimental work concerning social evaluation from
the viewpoint of our definition and criteria, including our
current knowledge about the emergence of this skill in different
species and point out possible problems in research. This general
framework should facilitate comparative studies in different
species, and we hypothesize that the ability of social evaluation
is not necessarily restricted to primates (and maybe dogs), but it
is also present in other gregarious species.
The evaluation of individuals based on their behavior can be
formed after engaging in a face-to-face (direct) or in a third-
party (indirect) interaction. Acquiring information about others’
behavior by direct interaction might be the best predictor of their
future behavior; however, in certain situations it can have a high
cost. Thus learning about others and their behavioral tendencies
by observing an interaction between two or more individuals can
be advantageous (cf. social eavesdropping; Bonnie and Earley,
2007). However, this type of social information may be more
difficult to handle cognitively and it is less accurate due to the
possible lack of information about the social relationships and
rules that are present in the observed group (Subiaul et al.,
2008).
Throughout the present review, we use the term prosocial for
cooperative and helpful behaviors, and the term antisocial for
partners that hinder another to reach its goal or act selfishly in
a cooperative situation.
GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL
EVALUATION
General Criteria for Social Evaluation
Social evaluation is defined as a mental process during which
an individual (1) assigns different values (positive, negative) to
particular behavioral patterns (e.g., helping, hindering) that are
performed in a social interaction (e.g., problem solving), (2)
associates these behaviors with specific individuals (partnership
values) and (3) shows different behaviors (e.g., avoidance or
preference) toward others based on the overall value which has
been associated with them.
Social evaluation is composed of two building blocks.
Negativity bias refers to an aversion of negative (social) stimuli
that can manifest in the avoidance of the antisocial partner
(Hamlin et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2013a; see below). In
contrast, positivity bias is the preference toward positive (social)
stimuli that can manifest in the preference toward the prosocial
partner (Hamlin et al., 2007; see below). It is important to
note that in the present review we use the terms negativity
and positivity bias only in a cooperative context and as the
manifestations of social evaluation, not in a general sense (Vaish
et al., 2008). However, we include not only cooperation, but
cooperative behavior as well, thus not only interactions that
provide benefit to both parties, but also take into account the
actions of a single individual toward the other (for the argument
about the distinction between the two terms, see Bergmüller et al.,
2007).
In the simplest case, there can be three possible scenarios
according to the behavior of the potential partners in which the
subject may show its preference: positive vs. negative partners;
positive vs. neutral partners; and negative vs. neutral partners.
Based on the fitness consequences we expect that individuals
choose the relatively positive partners, thus the prosocial partners
in the first two, and the neutral partner in the third scenario.
In the current literature researchers tend to refer to social
evaluation even when individuals only show avoidance of a
negative partner, but do not discriminate between a prosocial
and a neutral agent (Anderson et al., 2013a). In contrast, we
suggest that the term social evaluation should be restricted to
cases when both negativity and positivity bias can be detected,
that is, the individual shows clear preference in all three scenarios
(Table 1). Our assumption is that negativity and positivity bias
emerge independently from each other and evolve later to a
unified behavior system, i.e., both abilities can occur without the
presence of the other. Thus social evaluation can be considered
as a hierarchical system, in which negativity and positivity biases
are the building blocks that merge into a unified system. Social
evaluation cumulates both negative and positive partnership
values which results in the avoidance of or the preference
toward others based on their overall partnership values. In
some species social evaluation ability may also be able to take
into consideration the context of the behavior and weight the
importance of it to the overall value (Figure 1, see later).
We would like to emphasize that other features of the potential
partner, for example, its skillfulness as a cooperator also have an
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TABLE 1 | Manifestations of social evaluation and its building blocks in
case of different partner-type arrangements.
Type of the partners Response
Partner Partner Building block Phenomenon
A B
Prosocial > Antisocial Negativity and/or
positivity bias
–
Prosocial > Neutral Positivity bias Social
evaluation
Neutral > Antisocial Negativity bias
effect on the individuals’ choice when recruiting a collaborator
(Melis et al., 2006). We argue that both aspects (skillfulness
and prosociality) are important in such contexts and the two
cannot be separated sharply; however, they can be discussed
independently (e.g., in case of two equally effective partners their
level of prosociality can have an impact on individuals’ choice).
In the present review, we will focus only on the importance of
negativity and positivity bias as the basis of partner choice.
The Two Facets of Social Evaluation
In the following, we summarize the two different types of
manifestations of social evaluation, in terms of function, that is,
how these skills may contribute to fitness. Based on the function
of these biases we suggest that there is probably a stronger natural
selection on negativity, than on positivity bias due to the higher
cost involved in case of the former.
The Function of Negativity Bias
The aversion toward any type of negative stimuli that reduce
survival is an advantageous skill; including those associated
with social interactions. For example, capuchin monkeys (Cebus
apella) are known to be prosocial and cooperate in many
situations (de Waal et al., 1993; Mendres and de Waal, 2000).
Thus one may expect that they have the ability to recognize and
avoid antisocial others. In line with this Anderson et al. (2013a)
found that in laboratory setting capuchin monkeys show aversion
to an antisocial human partner compared to a neutral one after
observing that the partner refused to help in a problem situation
(see below).
Engaging in any kind of interaction with an antisocial agent
can have harmful consequences, thus avoiding these individuals
in general prevents the possibility of a bad outcome. Interacting
with an unfamiliar individual about whom one does not have any
information can also be risky. In these cases the situation itself
has the main effect on the individual’s choice, i.e., if choosing an
antisocial partner has higher cost than the advantage gained by
choosing a prosocial individual then it is better to avoid to the
unfamiliar partner. Thus the unfamiliarity of a partner can have
a negative partnership value. For example, in bluestreak cleaner
wrasses (Labroides dimidiatus) and their client reef fishes, it is
more advantageous to the client to choose the known cleaner
rather than an unknown one (Bshary and Grutter, 2006; see the
details later).
The Function of Positivity Bias
In a general sense positivity bias is the preference toward positive
(social) stimuli. As noted above, not being able to choose the
(more) prosocial partner may result in smaller cost in terms
of fitness. However, in long-term closed groups, preference for
prosocial individuals may lead to significant gains. Thus one
might hypothesize that in such species there would be a positive
selection for this skill. Unfortunately, in most of the studies
investigating the ability to discriminate between prosocial and
antisocial partners we cannot distinguish between positivity and
negativity bias due to the lack of comparison with a neutral
partner. However, Hamlin et al. (2007) found that from at least
6 months of age human infants show preference toward the
prosocial partner compared to a neutral one. In spite of the lack
of evidence, we assume that in non-human species that live in
closed, long-term social groups positivity bias might emerge as
well.
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL
EVALUATION
In the following, we review experimental studies which we have
identified as tackling the same phenomenon, despite the fact that
FIGURE 1 | Development of fully fledged social evaluation in humans. According to Hamlin et al. (2010) negativity bias emerges soon after birth and at around
6 months of age positivity bias also manifests (Hamlin et al., 2007). Later infants are also able to take into account the context and the relative social roles of the
partners (Hamlin et al., 2011). Based on results of Skowronski and Carlston (1987) at least adult humans weight the performed behavior of others when assigning
partnership values to them.
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they may have been put forward on different theoretical basis and
utilize a different terminology.
Social Evaluation in Human Infants
In a series of studies, Hamlin et al. (2007, 2010, 2011) investigated
whether human infants show different behavior toward prosocial
and antisocial partners. Researchers used different inanimate
agents (geometrical shapes or hand puppets) as social partners
and presented an interaction between them to the infants. In
these scenes a recipient needed help to reach a goal (e.g., get to
the top of a hill, get open a box, etc.) and interacted with either a
prosocial (helper), an antisocial (hinderer), or a neutral agent. In
their first study, Hamlin et al. (2007) investigated whether infants
of 6 and 10 months of age show some behavioral evidence for
social evaluation. Infants observed an inanimate object trying to
go up a hill and failing twice, and then another agent entered
the scene. Based on their role the partner helped or hindered
the recipient to reach its goal, and the neutral partner moved
uphill or downhill without engaging in an interaction. Infants of
both age groups chose the prosocial partner over the antisocial
and the neutral agent and before reaching for the partner they
looked longer at the prosocial than the antisocial agent (Hamlin
et al., 2010). These results suggested that infants as young as
6 months are able to socially evaluate others in a cooperative
context.
Some authors raised concerns about the method used by
Hamlin et al. (2007) and argued that some aspects of the
procedure might have influenced infants’ choice preference (Scarf
et al., 2012; but see Hamlin, 2014b). However, Hamlin and
Wynn (2011) obtained similar results in infants of different ages
in other situations playing with hand puppets in front of the
subject. In one of the experiments in the observed scene the
recipient tried to open a box to obtain the toy from inside,
but failed. Then either a prosocial partner helped to open the
box or an antisocial agent shut it hindering the recipient to
obtain the toy. In the other experiment, infants saw an agent
playing with a ball and dropping it accidentally in the direction
of one of two agents. After the agent grabbed the ball, the
recipient asked for it. The prosocial agent gave it back to the
recipient, but the antisocial partner took it offstage. In the
first experiment they found that infants of 5 and 9 months
of age choose the prosocial partner over the antisocial one
and found the same choice preference in 5-month-old infants
in the latter experiment as well. They also found that infants
of 3 months of age look longer (‘preferential looking’) at the
prosocial than at the antisocial agent in the social condition.
However, in these cases a neutral partner was never introduced
to the subjects, thus we do not know whether the observed
discrimination between the agents was due to negativity and/or
positivity bias.
In another study, Hamlin et al. (2011) used a similar procedure
to test selective social evaluation in 5- and 8-month-old infants,
i.e., whether the evaluation of others as prosocial or antisocial
depends on the relative social roles played by the partners
(relative partnership values). In this case subjects observed the
toy-in-the-box scene described previously and then the ball-
dropping play, but with the former prosocial or antisocial
individual as the recipient. Authors found that while 5-month-
old infants choose the prosocial partner in both cases regardless
of the role of the recipient in the toy-in-the-box scene, 8-
month-olds chose the antisocial partner, the partner that behaved
antisocially toward an antisocial agent. Their results suggested
that although younger infants only take into account the outcome
of the interaction between third-parties, at least from 8 months of
age they are able to evaluate the observed interactions globally.
Hamlin (2013a) also tested whether 5- and 8-month-old
infants are able to evaluate others based solely on their behavior
and not the outcome of their actions. In this study, they presented
different scenarios to the subjects by presenting hand puppets in
front of the infants as in previous studies. In the first experiment,
the valence of the partners were different, but the outcome
was the same from the viewpoint of the recipient (successful
helper vs. failed hinderer; failed helper vs. successful hinderer).
In the second experiment, the partners were a failed helper
and a failed hinderer, thus the outcomes of their actions were
contradictory with their individual social attitudes (e.g., failed
hinderer is antisocial, but the outcome is positive). In the third
case, they presented interactions in which the two partners had
the same status, however, the outcomes were different (e.g.,
successful helper vs. failed helper). In all experiments infants
could choose between the partners (two puppets) presented to
them after the display. Only 8-month-old infants distinguished
between the partners in the different experiments based on their
behavior and not simply the positive or negative outcome of
their actions, meaning that they chose the prosocial partner over
the antisocial one. However, Hamlin (2014a) later found that
when enough time is given to 5-month-old infants to process the
interactions, they are also able to take into account the context in
the evaluation of others.
The above results suggest that social evaluation emerges in
at least 5–6 months old human infants, and one study showed
that 3-month-olds also show preference toward the prosocial
agent over the antisocial (Hamlin and Wynn, 2011). So far only
one study investigated whether at 3 months of age positivity
and/or negativity bias can be detected in infants. Hamlin et al.
(2010) presented the ‘hill paradigm’ (see above; Hamlin et al.,
2007) to 3-month-old infants and used preferential looking to
measure whether they discriminate among prosocial, antisocial,
and neutral agents. They found that infants this young looked
longer at the prosocial than the antisocial partner, however, they
did not differentiate between the prosocial and the neutral agent.
In contrast, they looked four times longer at the neutral than the
antisocial partner. Although a few months later infants showed
preference toward a prosocial agent and apparently were able to
take into account contextual information as well, at 3 months of
age negativity, but not positivity bias can be detected. Based on
this result authors concluded that the ability to socially evaluate
others is a fundamental capacity; however, according to our
criterion without the emergence of positivity bias this cannot be
considered as social evaluation.
There was only one study in which researchers used
a ‘sharing’ situation as the observed interaction in human
infants (Herrmann et al., 2013). This is unfortunate from
the comparative viewpoint because in non-human species
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researchers mainly used this particular situation to test social
evaluation ability. Herrmann et al. (2013) first tested 30-month-
old toddlers in direct interaction with two human partners and
later presented a third-party interaction involving the same two
humans now behaving toward a recipient. The human partner
was either prosocial and tried to give a ball to the recipient
(the toddler in the direct and an adult human in the indirect
interaction), or antisocial who prevented the transfer by the
prosocial human. Then both partners offered a ball to the
toddler who could reach for one of them. The same moment the
toddler reached for the ball, the partners withdrew their hands.
The researchers found that after engaging in direct interaction
with the partners toddlers show preference toward the prosocial
human, while after watching the third-party interaction they did
not show preference toward either of the partners. Note, however,
in the latter case they had negative direct experience at choice
(both humans withdrew their hands when the toddler reached
for the ball) which probably had greater influence than evaluating
them based on their behavior toward others. Thus, we cannot
separate the effect of direct experiences with the partners from the
results in the third-party interaction. It is also worth to note that
although these results suggest that 30-month-old toddlers have
difficulties in discriminating between prosocial and antisocial
others in a third-party interaction, Hamlin et al. (2007, 2011) and
Hamlin (2013a) found that infants as young as 5–6 months of age
discriminate between prosocial and antisocial partners.
Hamlin et al. (2011) tested also 19- and 23-month-old toddlers
in the box-opening and ball-playing scenario with hand puppets
as partners. In this case in the test phase toddlers either got one
treat to give it to one of the partners or had to take one treat
from one of the partners. They found that toddlers of both ages
gave the treat to the prosocial partner and took one from the
antisocial one. Another research group found different results as
Hamlin et al. (2011) when using adult humans as partners in
a similar set up as the ball-playing scenario (Dahl et al., 2013).
In this study, 17-, 22-, and 26-month-old toddlers observed an
interaction between three humans. The experimenter (recipient)
invited the partners to play and rolled them a ball. After the
recipient asked them to roll it back, the prosocial partner did at
request, but the antisocial human put it away. In the test phase the
two partners both tried to reach the same object and the infants
were allowed to help them. Dahl et al. (2013) found that infants
of 17 and 22 months of age help equally often to the partners and
only at the age of 26 months they prefer to help the prosocial
partner over the antisocial human.
The results of the studies by Hamlin et al. (2010, 2011) and
Hamlin (2013a) suggest a development of social evaluation in
human infants: first only negativity bias can be detected and
around 5–6 months of age positivity bias emerges, making the
functioning of a social evaluation system complete. However,
based on the results of Dahl et al. (2013) and Herrmann et al.
(2013) we should be careful to draw conclusions about the
functionality of this system at a very young age.
There are main differences between the studies described
above. Hamlin et al. (2007, 2011) used inanimate objects as
partners and presented different helping situations to infants of
different ages, while the other two research groups tested older
infants and used humans as partners. Furthermore, Herrmann
et al. (2013) used a sharing situation instead of the helping
scenario. Thus methodological differences across studies could be
responsible for these divergent findings (see Discussion).
Recently, Salvadori et al. (2015) attempted to reproduce the
study of Hamlin and Wynn (2011) by using the same procedure
with slight modifications, but they failed to find the same results.
Although such studies (Dahl et al., 2013; Salvadori et al., 2015)
weaken the findings of Hamlin et al. (2007) and Hamlin and
Wynn (2011), it should be take into consideration that the latter
group found similar behavior in different contexts in children
of different ages. However, there is a need for further studies to
strengthen the latter findings.
Comparative Experiments with
Non-human Species
Other than humans the phenomenon has been studied only
in non-human primate species, dogs and in cleaner-client
reef fish interactions. In non-human animals, the ability
to discriminate between prosocial and antisocial others was
investigated from different perspectives and researchers used
different, but related terms to describe the phenomenon. In this
overview, the conceptual approach of the original experimental
studies provided the basis of the categorization. In the following,
we use the terms negativity/positivity bias and social evaluation
in the above meaning, and refer to the terms used in the original
studies only in the subtitles.
Reputation Formation in Non-human Apes
Researchers tested chimpanzees, bonobos (Pan paniscus), gorillas
(Gorilla gorilla) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) in different
food sharing situations (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008;
Herrmann et al., 2013). In these studies, researchers used similar
procedures in which subjects observed a human (or a conspecific)
begging for food from two persons. In all cases, the prosocial
partner gave food to the recipient (beggar), but the other partner
either refused to share (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul et al., 2008)
or prevented the prosocial human to give food to the recipient
(Herrmann et al., 2013). After the observation phase subjects
were allowed to choose between the partners who offered food
to them. Upon subject’s request either the prosocial partner gave
and the antisocial partner refused to give food (Subiaul et al.,
2008) or neither of the partners shared food (Russell et al., 2008;
Herrmann et al., 2013).
There are two experiments (Russell et al., 2008; Subiaul
et al., 2008; Experiment 1) that are mostly comparable with the
studies conducted with human infants. In Russell et al. (2008)
chimpanzees observed a third-party interaction between three
humans. They found that only chimpanzees, but not bonobos,
orangutans and gorillas prefer the prosocial human over the
antisocial partner after observing a food sharing situation
between them and a human recipient.
Unfortunately, in Russell et al. (2008) there is no information
about the results of the critical first trial (whether there is
a significant difference between times spent next to the two
partners). However, subjects had direct experience with the
partners during this trial which could influence their behavior
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toward the humans later. Considering that in chimpanzees there
was a decline in time spent next to the antisocial partner over the
trials, it would be interesting to see whether there was a significant
difference between times spent next to the two partners in the first
trial.
Furthermore, because the antisocial partner did not simply
refuse to give, but also hit the recipient when he tried to reach the
container, subjects might have been simply afraid of the antisocial
human and this is why they avoided her. Considering that there
is a decline over trials in approaching the antisocial partner,
but there is no increase in the case of the prosocial partner, we
can conclude that chimpanzees might show negativity, but not
positivity bias in this context.
Subiaul et al. (2008) tested the same chimpanzee subjects
in three experiments relying on the same procedures. In the
first experiment, in which two unfamiliar humans behaved
prosocially or antisocially toward a familiar human, none of the
chimpanzees showed any preference toward the prosocial human
partners after 16 trials. Thus, in the second experiment subjects
received an extensive training to choose the prosocial partner
after direct interaction. They were tested in blocks of eight trials
and reached the criterion when they chose the familiar prosocial
human at least seven times out of eight in two consecutive
blocks. Four chimpanzees (out of seven) who reached the criteria
showed significant preference toward both prosocial familiar and
unfamiliar humans in subsequent tests. In the third experiment
the same four subjects observed eight pairs of unfamiliar human
partners interacting with another chimpanzee (six trials with each
pairs of partners; third-party interaction). Subjects were tested
in six trials with each pairs of partners and if they chose the
prosocial one they obtained food from them (were reinforced for
the correct choice), but not if they chose the antisocial partner. In
the first test trials with the different partners the mean preference
toward the prosocial unfamiliar human was 53%. However, in
case of three out of four subjects during the first four sessions
(24 trials with four different pairs of partners) the choice of the
prosocial partner increased to 75%.
Thus it seems that chimpanzees in Subiaul et al. (2008)
discriminated between prosocial and antisocial human partners
only after receiving specific training. Furthermore, in the
third experiment subjects not only could rely on their earlier
direct experiences with partners showing similar behavior, but
also during testing they received reinforcement to choose
the prosocial partner (direct interaction). Thus it seems that
chimpanzees do not show spontaneous discrimination between
prosocial and antisocial human partners after indirect experience.
In their first experiment, Herrmann et al. (2013) exposed
subjects (apes and 30-months-old human children) to a prosocial
partner who attempted to offer them a piece of food, when the
antisocial partner interfered and prevented the action by taking
the food away (direct experience). After directly interacting with
the partners orangutans and human children (see earlier) chose
the prosocial partner more often, however, not chimpanzees and
bonobos. In the next experiment the same subjects observed the
same partners behaving the same way toward a third human
(third-party interaction). In the test phase, both partners offered
a piece of food to the subjects, but when they reached for it, both
of the partners withdrew their hands. In this case orangutans and
chimpanzees, but not bonobos and human children, preferred the
prosocial partner.
However, some elements of the procedure used by Herrmann
et al. (2013) could influence subjects’ choice. For example, as a
response to the stealing by the antisocial partner the prosocial
partner expressed her frustration by hitting and pushing the
antisocial partner. This behavior of the prosocial partner could
have elicited avoidance behavior on the part of the subject, thus
the nature of this partner was not necessarily considered as
prosocial.
In most of these experiments, subjects engaged in direct
interaction with the partners before the third-party interaction,
thus we cannot separate the effect of this experience from
their results in the indirect context. Based on these it is
still unclear whether chimpanzees and orangutans discriminate
spontaneously between a prosocial and an antisocial partner after
witnessing a third-party interaction.
Further problem is that only prosocial and antisocial
partners were presented to the subjects. Thus even evidence
for discrimination between the partners would not fulfill our
definition of social evaluation.
Social Eavesdropping in Domestic Dogs
Recent findings suggest that dogs are able to coordinate their
actions with each other and humans in cooperative tasks (Bräuer
et al., 2013; Ostojic´ and Clayton, 2014). Thus showing avoidance
of antisocial partners and/or preference toward prosocial ones
can be advantageous in this species. Many dogs live in multi-
human/dog groups, and get often in contact with other people.
Thus considering that humans provide them different resources,
it would be advantageous to be able to obtain information by
observing their interactions with others. Domestic dogs were
tested in food sharing situations to find out whether they show
different behavior toward two human partners based on their
behavior toward a third-party (Marshall-Pescini et al., 2011;
Nitzschner et al., 2014; see below in detail). There was only one
study in which dogs were tested in a helping situation (Chijiiwa
et al., 2015; see below in detail).
Marshall-Pescini et al. (2011), Freidin et al. (2013), and
Nitzschner et al. (2014) used a similar food sharing situation as
described for non-human primates. Although the results of the
experiment by Marshall-Pescini et al. (2011) showed that dogs
prefer the prosocial human partner over the antisocial partner,
the latter two studies suggested that dogs’ choice was influenced
by the location of the human (in the test situation) rather than the
identity and behavior. Kundey et al. (2011) tested dogs in a similar
third-party interaction. However, they varied several elements of
the procedure, for example, in one experiment either the recipient
was an inanimate self-propelled object or the human partners
sat inside boxes (they were invisible). The unfamiliar prosocial
partner gave food to the recipient by placing it in front of her,
while the antisocial partner put it front of the recipient and when
she reached for it, the partner removed the food (prevented the
recipient to take it). They found that dogs reliably choose the
prosocial partner across experiments over the antisocial one, thus
suggested that they are able to evaluate others based on their
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behavior in a social context. Considering that dogs showed this
choice even when the “partners” were two boxes or the human
partners behaved toward an inanimate object, dogs might simply
associated the exchange of food with one of the partners and did
not evaluate them based on their behavior toward another.
Nitzschner et al. (2012) conducted a study presenting
a different situation than sharing food. Dogs observed an
interaction between two human partners and a dog; the partner
was either a nice human who behaved friendly with the
demonstrator dog or a human who simply ignored the dog. Even
though after a direct interaction subjects spend more time next
to the nice experimenter, after the third-party interaction dogs
did not show different behavior toward them. We suggest one
alternative explanation other than raised in the original paper that
can explain dogs’ behavior in this latter case. From the viewpoint
of the demonstrator dog the humans could be considered as
nice or ignoring, however, the subjects (witnessing the human-
demonstrator interaction) were ignored by both humans (direct
experience). We suggest that this direct experience could have
greater effect on dogs than the information gathered in the
third-party interaction.
Recently Carballo et al. (2015) investigated further whether
dogs are able to discriminate between prosocial and antisocial
humans after direct experience. The humans pointed at one of
two bowls in front of the dog that contained food. However,
while the prosocial partner let the dog eat the food, the antisocial
partner took the food and ate it as soon as the dog found it. If
there was a gender difference between the partners then dogs
discriminated between them after six trials; 12 trials were needed
for similar performance if both partners had the same gender
(females). Thus it seems that even in the case of direct interaction
dogs need more experience with human partners to discriminate
between them based on their behavior.
Chijiiwa et al. (2015) implemented a helping scenario similar
to the one used by Anderson et al. (2013a; see the next section).
Dogs observed that their owner tried to open a container,
but failed and requested help from one of the two human
partners who (depending on the experimental group) either
helped (prosocial) or refused to help by turning her head away
(antisocial). The other (neutral) partner sat there quietly without
engaging in any interaction. In a control group the owner stopped
manipulating the object and then one of the human partners
turned her head away. Thus only one of the partners was active
during the demonstration and the owner interacted with this
partner only (no interaction in the control condition). In the test
trials dogs in the control group chose randomly. Dogs did not
show any preference for the prosocial vs. neutral (non-active)
partner. In contrast, dogs avoided the antisocial partner in favor
of the neutral one.
However, several aspects of the procedure could have
influenced the results of Chijiiwa et al. (2015). In case of
Anderson et al. (2013a; see details later) the neutral partner
was the recipient, thus subjects could see the action of the
neutral partner as well, while in Chijiiwa et al. (2015) the neutral
partner did not show any behavior during the observation phase
(no interaction with the recipient). Thus the only available
information about this partner was that she offered food during
the test trials (prosocial act in direct interaction with the subject).
Also, in the four test trials dogs had direct interaction with
the partners who gave food to them upon request (including
the neutral and antisocial partner). Thus information about the
partners obtained during observations and in test trials were
contradictory for some partners and may have influenced the
results. Importantly, recalculations of the original data showed no
significant difference between conditions in the first test trial1, i.e.,
no difference in subjects’ choice between the ‘active’ (prosocial,
antisocial, and control) and the neutral partners. It is also worth
to mention that in this study the recipient was the subject’s
owner, thus the recipient/owner could carry over some contextual
information from everyday life (interactions between the owner
and others) to the situation used in the study.
In sum, although several studies were conducted with dogs
it is not clear whether they adjust their behavior toward the
partners based on their behavior toward others in a third-party
interaction. Furthermore, due to the procedural arrangements
we do not have clear information about the emergence of social
evaluation or its components.
Social Evaluation in Capuchin and Marmoset
Monkeys
In capuchin monkeys, Anderson et al. (2013a) used a problem
solving situation to investigate social evaluation. Capuchins
could witness two human partners who sat next to each other.
One of them was always the recipient who tried to open a
container to obtain an object from inside. In different trials
(within subject design) the other person helped, refused to help,
tried to help, but failed, or simply failed to acknowledge the
help requested by the other person. After having observed the
interaction between two partners, the capuchins could choose
from whom they accept a piece of food. The recipient served as a
neutral partner considering that she did not behave prosocially
or antisocially. The capuchins chose the neutral partner over
the antisocial partner in all cases, however, they did not show
preference toward any of the humans when the partner helped,
tried to help or was occupied during the request (was prosocial
or neutral). These results suggest that capuchin monkeys show
negativity, but not positivity bias that is not considered as social
evaluation according to our criterion. This result is similar to
that of 3-month-old infants who also showed negativity, but
not positivity bias after observing a helping interaction between
inanimate agents (Hamlin et al., 2010). However, we should
note, that this refers to the mean performance reported after
repeated experimental trials and we also have no information
about capuchins’ choice in the first trial.
In a different study, Anderson et al. (2013b) investigated
whether capuchins discriminate between two humans after
observing a third-party reciprocity situation. Subjects observed
1Although the results of the first test trial (in which dogs only had indirect
information about the partners) was not reported in the original study, by using
the data reported in the Appendix of Chijiiwa et al. (2015) (Table 1) we found
that there was no significant difference in any of the conditions (Binomial GLMM;
condition × trial: p = 0.870; trial 1 in case of Helper condition vs. Non-helper
condition: p = 0.5; Helper condition vs. Control condition: p = 0.5; Non-helper
condition vs. Control condition: p= 1.0).
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a ball-transfer between two humans; A requested balls and B
gave her own, and later B asked them back. In this case A
either reciprocated or refused it by turning her head away. Then
the partners offered food for the subjects who were allowed to
choose from which of the partners they accept it. Capuchins
did not show preference toward either of the partners after
witnessing a reciprocated action by A, however, they chose
the prosocial partner over the antisocial human after the non-
reciprocated interaction. We suggest that in contrast to Anderson
et al. (2013a), the recipient in this case was not a neutral
agent considering that at the beginning of the interaction B
transferred balls to A, thus it behaved prosocially. Based on
this, capuchins observed an interaction between two prosocial
partners, and between a prosocial and an antisocial partner. Thus
the avoidance of the antisocial partner in the second scenario was
not necessarily due to negativity bias and we cannot exclude the
possibility of the presence of positivity bias either.
Kawai et al. (2014) investigated sensitivity to third-party
reciprocity in common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus). Similarly
as in Anderson et al. (2013b) in case of the reciprocal event
the two humans (A and B) exchanged food, while in the non-
reciprocal condition there was an initial transfer from B to A, but
A refused to give food to B. Their results were similar as with
capuchin monkeys (Anderson et al., 2013b), subjects were willing
to accept food from both partner in the reciprocity condition;
however, they preferred partner B in the condition where A
refused to transfer. However, because of the similarities in the
procedures the same problem arises here as in Anderson et al.
(2013b), meaning that no neutral partner was introduced to the
subjects and thus discrimination between the partners could be
due to negativity and positivity bias as well.
Thus it seems that in capuchin monkeys at least negativity
bias can be detected, however, we do not have convincing data
on whether they show positivity bias as well, thus whether they
are able to evaluate others socially. In case of marmoset monkeys
we are also lack of information about the presence of negativity
and/or positivity bias.
Reputation Formation in Cleaner-Client Reef Fish
Interactions
The formerly described species are either share the same
evolutionary clade with humans (non-human primates) or live
in close contact with them (dogs). However, we suggest that
similar capacity might be shown in non-mammalian species as
well. Bshary (2002) and Bshary and Grutter (2006) conducted
studies on bluestreak cleaner wrasses and their client reef fish
species. Cleaners remove the ectoparasites from their client fish,
however, some of them might consume the mucus and thus
become a parasite instead of a cooperator. Clients also have
the opportunity to eat the cleaner fish, however, this is less
likely (Bshary, 2002). Thus for the client it is crucial to predict
the prosocial or antisocial nature of the unfamiliar cleaner fish.
In their study Bshary and Grutter (2006) used a procedurally
similar method to that used in primates and dogs. They found
that clients spend significantly more time next to a cleaner
that they had the chance to observe while cooperating than
next to a cleaner that did not engage in an interaction with
the model client fish. In this case the second partner can be
considered as a neutral partner and the cooperative cleaner as
a prosocial individual, thus the choice behavior of the clients
can refer to a positivity bias. However, in this case choosing
an ‘unknown’ partner who might be antisocial has high cost.
Thus clients might simply avoid the potential antisocial partner,
thus the potential harmful consequences. The results of Tebbich
et al. (2002) strengthen this assumption. They found that during
the first 2 min of an experiment cleaner fish spends more
time in the proximity of a familiar than an unfamiliar client
(Ctenochaetus striatus). In the field, Bshary (2002) also found
that clients were more likely to choose (invite for inspection)
the cleaner whose previous interaction was positive than the
one that was chased off by the client or its client darted off
(negative interaction). However, if there was a longer time lag
(>5 s) clients’ choice was not affected by the previous interaction
of the cleaner. Unfortunately, in this situation the client could
choose only between prosocial and antisocial partners, thus
it is not possible to establish whether the skills of these fish
fulfill the criteria of social evaluation. It would be interesting
to examine the behavior of the clients when presenting them
an interaction between a prosocial, antisocial, and ‘unknown’
partner in different arrangements to see whether we can detect
negativity and/or positivity bias.
These results suggest that although currently the phenomenon
is mainly studied in primates and dogs, it would be interesting
and useful to conduct similar studies on other taxa as well.
DISCUSSION
Comparison of Studies with Non-human
and Human Animals
The Functional Concept of Social Evaluation
The investigation of social evaluation from an evolutionary and
comparative perspective indicates that there is a need for general
agreement on terminology and definition. We put forward that
the concept of social evaluation should be reserved for assigning
partnership values to other individuals in the group independent
from its direction (negative or positive), although it is clear
that avoiding others in such context is a more prevalent skill
in animals. Accordingly, social evaluation allows the individual
to enhance its fitness by being able to choose its partners
for cooperative interaction based on direct or indirect (third-
party) experience. This functional definition seems to provide a
general framework for comparing different clades of animals that
depending on the evolutionary history and ecological status may
or may not display this skill.
Unfortunately, the possibilities of comparative investigations
are limited but from an ecological and phylogenetic viewpoint
non-human apes could provide an opportunity to establish
specific hypotheses in relation to the manifestation of social
evaluation. The few surviving species live in a variety of social
organizations in which the significance of social evaluation
could be different. Chimpanzees and bonobos live in large
complex groups in which individuals engage in cooperative
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and competitive interactions, develop friendships (Silk, 2002,
2003) and form also coalitions (de Waal, 1984). In contrast the
hierarchical groups in gorillas typically consist of a female harem
and their offspring led by an adult dominant male (Robbins et al.,
2004). Finally, orangutans are solitary for most of their life; many
females live alone or with their offspring on non-overlapping
territories of males (Singleton and van Schaik, 2002).
Thus based purely on their ecology we may predict that a well-
developed ability of social evaluation should contribute to higher
fitness in chimpanzees and bonobos, while its role in gorillas
and orangutans could be negligible. Alternatively, fully functional
social evaluation may have evolved much earlier in primate
evolution and its manifestation depends on epigenetic factors
(Chapman and Rothman, 2009). In this case testing captive
individuals of these species may not provide meaningful insights
because the social structure of these groups may differ from that
in nature (Brent, 1992; Boesch, 2007), and their socialization to
humans may also influence the development of social evaluation.
Contradictory Results, Methodological Issues
Researchers conducted similar studies with non-human primates
and dogs both from the viewpoint of partners and situation
(Russell et al., 2008; Marshall-Pescini et al., 2011); however, the
results were contradictory in most of the cases. For example, in
chimpanzees Russell et al. (2008) found that they show preference
toward the prosocial human partner over the antisocial one
after observing third-party interaction, however, the results of
Subiaul et al. (2008) suggest that even in direct interaction
it takes several trials for chimpanzees to choose the prosocial
partner. In contrast, in Herrmann et al. (2013) chimpanzees did
not discriminate between the partners in a direct interaction,
only after observing their behavior toward another human later
(indirect interaction).
It is also interesting that human infants’ performance seems
to be influenced by the method used. In case of human
infants and toddlers the set up that was used most often
included inanimate objects as partners, and different helping
situations were demonstrated to the subjects (Hamlin et al.,
2007; Hamlin and Wynn, 2011). Despite some differences in
details (e.g., context-dependency) the results show that social
evaluation emerges relatively early in humans at around 5–6
months of age. However, when human adults were used as
partners, even in a similar situation, researchers failed to find
discrimination between the partners in 17- and 22-month-old
toddlers (Dahl et al., 2013); they only found discrimination
between the prosocial and antisocial human partners in 26-
month-old toddlers. Herrmann et al. (2013) also failed to
show discrimination between human partners in 30-month-old
toddlers in third-party interaction using a sharing situation.
There was only one study in which helping situation was used in
non-human primates. Anderson et al. (2013a) found evidence for
negativity bias in capuchin monkeys, and the findings of another
study by Anderson et al. (2013b) also suggest that capuchin
monkeys show negativity and/or positivity bias after observing
the interaction between two human partners.
Thus it is likely that the different procedures measure different
aspects of social evaluation in human children, and this should
be clarified before these data are compared to those obtained
from non-human animals. However, an important issue should
be considered here as well: helping and sharing are two distinct
domains (Warneken and Tomasello, 2009), and the presence of
one does not indicate the functioning of the other. For example, it
has been found that both human children and chimpanzees show
helping behavior, but only the former tend to share resources with
others (for a review, see Warneken and Tomasello, 2009). In light
of this, we suggest that it is unfortunate that helping has been
used most often when investigating social evaluation in children,
but sharing situations in case of non-human species. Thus, we
propose that in future studies this issue should be taken into
account as well.
One might argue that in non-human primates and dogs
using heterospecific partners could affect the outcome. However,
companion dogs spend their life with humans and the tested
non-human primates were also socialized to humans. Due to
their extensive experience with humans it was not necessarily
disadvantageous to use humans as partners in these studies but
further comparative studies are warranted.
However, former experiences with conspecifics and/or
humans and subjects expectation toward them can influence
subjects’ behavior in studies investigating social behavior
and cognition (Krause et al., 2011; Gergely et al., 2015).
Several studies with domestic dogs support this assumption
(Szetei et al., 2003; Erdõhegyi et al., 2007; and see also Topál
et al., 2009) in which researchers showed that some aspect of
dogs’ cognitive skills can be masked by using human social
communicative cues and thus false conclusions can be drawn
about their cognitive abilities. Utilization of unfamiliar moving
inanimate objects (robots) as social partners can be useful in
such investigations especially if the physical appearance of
the robot does not resemble the embodiment of the subject
species or any heterospecifics with whom they engage in daily
interactions (Gergely et al., 2013). This way the test itself can
be controlled by the experimenter more efficiently and it is
also less likely that the robotic partner induces aversion. The
novelty of the social partner hinders the possibility that subjects
have any preliminary assumption about how the partner should
behave in a given context (separation of expectations and the
displayed behavior). The results of studies conducted with
human infants using unfamiliar inanimate objects (Hamlin
et al., 2011) and humans (Dahl et al., 2013) as partners also
suggest that utilization of robots in such investigations can be
advantageous.
Although, in the present review our main concern was about
the emergence of social evaluation in third-party interactions,
we would like to emphasize that subjects’ direct experience is
also important (see below). Unfortunately, to our knowledge no
studies have been conducted in which researchers would have
systematically tested and compared the role of direct and indirect
experiences in this context.
To investigate such questions, experimenters would need
to control subjects’ experiences with other individuals (either
conspecifics or heterospecifics). The utilization of unfamiliar
inanimate agents may provide a solution to this problem because
this offers the possibility to control subjects’ social experience.
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This way the amount of familiarization with the potential social
partners can be manipulated systematically. Only such well-
controlled methods can provide us with information about the
cues and triggers of the social evaluation system.
Cognitive Mechanisms in Social
Evaluation
It would be important to determine the decision rules on which
the social evaluation system is based and provide the basis of
the computations that it makes but there are several problematic
issues.
In case of either negativity or positivity bias, only the antisocial
or prosocial behavior of the partner is taken into account,
thus independently of the weight of the specific behavior, the
evaluation of the partner is unidirectional.
However, the situation is different if the social evaluation
system has to integrate both negative and positive inputs. At the
moment we have no measures that would suggest whether the
negative value of any specific antisocial behavior is higher or
lower, than the positive value of prosocial behaviors. Until such
values are determined experimentally, it is difficult to provide
any estimation on how the social evaluation system functions in
different species. In addition, we also do not know how kinship
and familiarity may modify individual biases.
Based on the current limited data it is difficult to determine
both the cues on which social evaluation is based on, as well
as the set of decision rules which are applied by the individuals
of different species. However, we suggest that there are several
features that could become triggers for the social evaluation
system. These could include, for example, the present behavioral
tendencies of the other individual and outcome of its actions
(positive/negative); the familiarity of the partner; and memories
about past interactions.
The Evolution of Social Evaluation
The evolution of cooperation is of great interest among
researchers (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Dugatkin, 1997;
Sachs et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006). Considering that evolution
is based on the survival of the fittest and individuals compete
with each other, it is somewhat surprising that cooperation is
widespread in the animal kingdom. Nowak (2006) suggested
five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation: kin selection,
direct and indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity and
group selection. Despite differences among these mechanisms
they all can be described by the cost-benefit ratio of
cooperation and defection. Cooperative social species may
also different in relying on individual recognition on which
social evaluation is based. So far there is no evidence that
individual recognition plays a specific role in cooperative
interactions in social insects, while experimental support for
social evaluation in many vertebrates (see above) involves
that group mates recognize each other as individuals. Thus
in the latter case individuals need to observe and remember
the previous interactions of others to be able to evaluate them
and adjust their own behavior toward others. In contrast,
cooperation in social insects is mostly based on recognition
of kinship which makes it less likely that social evaluation
evolves.
The Development of Social Evaluation
We argue that negativity and positivity bias emerges
independently during development and eventually is integrated
into a cognitive capacity, termed social evaluation. The earlier an
individual avoids harmful partners the better, however, showing
preference toward prosocial individuals is not necessarily crucial.
Although our main concern is about using third-party
information to evaluate social partners, in terms of development
(gaining experience) the role of direct information is probably
more significant. Direct interactions probably have greater
influence on individuals because the outcome is more
unequivocal. These experiences may actually help to process
information provided by observing third-party interactions
(social eavesdropping). During direct interactions individuals
can associate the observed behaviors of the other party with
the negative or positive outcome on themselves and later
recognize these behaviors in a third-party interaction as
well, and predict the future behavior of a potential partner
without the potential costs of direct experiences. A somewhat
similar cognitive scenario was envisaged for human infants to
explain how they come to recognize the similarity between
themselves and others (“like me” theory developed for
human infants; Meltzoff, 2005, 2007a,b). For the transition
from direct to third-party evaluation a cognitive system
would need to recognize (1) the similarity between the
individual’s own actions and the actions of the other (action
representation); (2) the similarity between its own reaction
to the other’s action and the reaction of others to similar
actions, and perhaps (3) being able to evaluate these effects in
terms of having negative and positive effect on some mental
states.
Learning about antisocial and prosocial behavioral tendencies
of partners may be facilitated by specific genetic predispositions,
the role of which may be larger in the case of the negativity bias
because of the greater cost involved. For example, Sackett (1966)
found that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) at the beginning
of 2 months of age show high frequency of disturbance (rocking,
huddling, self-clasping, fear, and withdrawal) to the picture of
a threatening monkey. Furthermore, when they were able to
control which picture would be projected, threat pictures were
turned on less frequently. He concluded that rhesus macaques are
predisposed to display fear at the sensitive period in development
even in the absence of previous experience.
Analogies on Evolutionary and
Ontogenetic Scales
The emergence of social evaluation can be presented on a timeline
that might be analogous on evolutionary and ontogenetic
timescales (Figure 1). Although in non-human animals there is
a lack of data on the emergence of social evaluation, at least
results in humans show that the emergence of negativity bias (at
3 months) is followed by the manifestation of positivity bias (at
around 6 months) (Hamlin et al., 2010; Hamlin, 2014a). Although
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the behavioral significance of these early skills is less clear (infants
at that age do not have the physical possibility to make a choice
between others), a full-fledged social evaluation system may be at
work by 5–6 months of age in humans.
Based on the ecological significance (larger effect on fitness)
and a single study in capuchin monkeys (Anderson et al., 2013a),
which used a comparable method to that applied in human
infants (Hamlin and Wynn, 2011), we predict that negativity
bias may be more widespread among non-human animals, and
evolved also earlier. Testing different species and manipulating
their social experience could provide some insight about the
relative contribution of genetic and developmental factors to
social evaluation.
Modeling the Mechanism of Social
Evaluation
Most experimental studies have been aimed at showing the
presence or absence of social evaluation at a certain age (in
humans) or in non-human animal species. Little attention has
been devoted to mechanisms. Further methodological problem
is that in infants spontaneous testing of social evaluation was
preferred, while in non-human animals more or less training was
applied before testing for social evaluation.
We have suggested that individuals may assign different
partnership values to others based on obtaining evidence
by either direct or indirect interactions. At some point
later in ontogeny they may form specific categories for
‘preferred/prosocial’ and ‘non-preferred/antisocial’ individuals
with whom they have extensive experience. Unfortunately, most
experimental setups test only for short term social evaluation in
which the subject is exposed to a single scenario with unfamiliar
partners. However, there is some experimental evidence that
infants are also able to calculate relative partnership values when
they prefer the antisocially behaving (basically prosocial) partner
if it punishes an antisocial partner (Hamlin et al., 2011). Some
authors further suggested that individuals might be able to weight
the actions of the partners based on their importance and/or
reliability as well. Thus some behavior, depending on the situation
it was performed in, can count as a better predictor of the
individual’s traits than others. For example, Skowronski and
Carlston (1987) found that adult humans rely more on negative
behaviors in case of morality related context and that extremely
negative behavior receives more weight than moderate negative
behavior.
Based on this, we have developed a simple descriptive
model for social evaluation which may provide a common
ground for comparative experiments (Figure 2). In this model,
individuals assign negative or positive values to the behaviors
performed by other individuals in direct or indirect interactions.
Novel information about their behavior shapes the mental
representation of them. Social evaluation manifests in the
individual’s choice of the neutral or the prosocial partner
depending on the available partners and whether both positivity
and negativity bias can be detected or only one of them is present
(for example, if only negativity bias is present, the individual
do not choose between a neutral and a prosocial partner).
Considering that the outcome of an interaction itself is not
necessarily the best predictor of the future behavior of others
some species may also be able to take into account the context
FIGURE 2 | Two models of negativity and positivity bias and the emergence of social evaluation. (A) This model is based on Anderson et al.’s (2013a)
results in capuchin monkeys; contextual evaluation is only hypothetical, there is no evidence in the study. (B) Simple model of social evaluation based on studies by
Hamlin et al. (2007) in human infants from around 6 months of age. An stands for the members of the individual’s group. The social evaluation system of the
individual cumulates the negative and positive values that are assigned to specific behavior of An in a given context. The individual chooses between the group
members based on their overall partnership value.
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as well (e.g., negative behavior can have positive value based on
the context it was performed, see Hamlin et al., 2011).
The results of formerly described studies show that similar
phenomena can be detected in different taxa and common
evolutionary origin of these cannot be excluded entirely,
however, methodological differences disallow any stronger
conclusion. Anderson et al. (2013a) suggested that based on
their results the capacity to socially evaluate others based
on information obtained in third-party interaction might
have been present in the common ancestor of Old World
and New World monkeys as well (based on our criterion
it only applies to negativity bias). However, they did not
exclude the possibility that similar phenomena in human
infants and capuchin monkeys are the result of convergent
evolution. As we suggested earlier, due to its significant effect
on survival showing avoidance to antisocial partners may be
more widespread, while positivity bias may emerge only in
specific social environments. Considering our initial hypothesis
that negativity and positivity bias develops independently it
may have different origins from an evolutionary point of
view.
CONCLUSION
Here, we defined social evaluation as the integrated behavior
and cognitive system of negativity and positivity bias, and
proposed that evaluation based on negative or positive aspects
of behavior may have different evolutionary and ontogenetic
origins. We further suggest that discrimination between prosocial
and antisocial partners in cooperative context is likely to be
widespread among species living in long-term closed social
groups. Results of studies conducted with non-human mammals
and observing interactions among client and cleaner reef fish
suggest that negativity and/or positivity bias can be detected in
species other than humans. However, we have no clear evidence
whether non-human animals are able to show such preference
only upon spontaneous observation of third-party interaction.
By conducting studies with a wider range of species having
different phylogenetic and ecological backgrounds, we could
obtain important information about the origin and development
of social evaluation. Considering that in humans social evaluation
is discussed in relation to morality, it would be important to find
out more details about the relative contribution of genetic and
environmental factors to social evaluation.
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